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FROM WHITE COLLAR CRIME TO EXPLOITATION: REDEFINITION OF A FIELD
HAROLD E. PEPINSKY*
INTRODUCTION
Whenever a definition of the boundaries of a
field of inquiry is created in the social sciences, the
definition has a great deal more than academic
significance. Researchers who develop knowledge
about the field and those who use the knowledge to
carry out policy both are constrained by the way
the field characterizes the social problems they
encounter. The field of white-collar crime exempli-
fies this constraint. When Sutherland defined
white-collar criminality, he' explicitly observed
that acceptance of his definition would imply
recognition of a set of social problems to be re-
solved through the application of research stated
in a new set of terms. He wrote:
The thesis of this paper is that the conception and
explanation of crime which have just been
described are misleading and incorrect, that crime
is, in fact, not closely correlated with poverty or
with the psychopathic and sociopathic conditions
associated with poverty, and that an adequate ex-
planation of criminal behavior must proceed along
different lines. The conventional explanations are
invalid principally because they are derived from
biased samples. The samples are biased in that
they have not included vast areas of criminal be-
havior of persons not in the lower class. One of these
neglected areas is the criminal behavior of business
and professional men, which will be analyzed in
this paper.
In other words, Sutherland agreed that a distinc-
tive social problem was posed by those who com-
mitted crimes and those who responded to the
crimes. He saw crime as a "legally defined social
injury" for which a "penal sanction" was provided,
as a conceptually unitary phenomenon against
which a society needed to protect itself.2 What
bothered him was that because of a class bias in
the previous definition of the phenomenon, per-
* Assistant Professor, School of Criminal Justice,
State University of New York at Albany.
I Sutherland, White Collar Criminality, 5 Aa. SocIo-
LOGIcAL Rxv. 1 (1940).
'Sutherland, Is "White-Collar Crime" Crime? 10
Am. SocioLOGICAL Rxv. 132 (1945). This article was
later published in a book by Sutherland. See E. SurmER-
LA=, W TE CoLL.A CiR (1961).
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sons of a higher socio.economic status often com-
mitted such injury with impunity. By defining
white-collar crime as a matter of justice, in the
sense discussed by Hart'-that like cases be treated
alike-he attempted to remove the class bias
inherent in previous. criminological research. In
reality, Sutherland's definition, of white-collar
crimewas an extension of the generic definition of
crime.
Opponents of the redefinition of crime have
generally argued that the redefinition: is too broad.
One legal scholar, Paul Tappan,4 typifies such
opposition in his argument that a crime exists for
purposes of research or other. social response, only
when it is that for which a defendant is prosecuted
and convicted. In part, this-paper attempts to
show that arguments such as. Tappan's, which
advocate narrowing Sutherland's definition of
crime, are untenable. In fact, the position taken
here is that, with respect -to- property crime at
least, Sutherland's redefinition is itself too narrow.
For one thing, the distinction -between what is and
is not crime cannot be adequately operationalized
in Sutherland's terms. For another, Sutherland
has failed to eliminate the social bias he decried- in
the older definition of crime. That a social injury is
legally defined and provided with a penal sanction
distinguishes it from other social injuries only by
the relatively great social powers of the legal
definition's adherents. In all other senses, the na-
ture of the social injury wrought by a Sutherland-
type crime is indistinguishable from the nature of
the social injury wrought by many non-criminal
acts.
The type of social injury common to what are
depicted as white-collar crimes is what is here
termed exploitation. This paper seeks to eliminate
the socio-economic bias that remained in Suther-
land's redefinition of crime by subsuming the
kind of phenomenon Sutherland called white-
collar crime under the broader category of exploita-
tion. The field of exploitation would thus supersede
the field of white-collar crime as a socio-economi-
a See H. L. A. HART, TRE CoNcn=r oF LAW (1961).
4 See Tappan, Who Is the .Criminal, 12 Am. Socio-
LOGIcAL REV. 96 (1947).
Vol. 65, No. 2
Printed in U.S.A
HAROLD E. PEPINSKY
cally, unbiased, conceptually unitary area for
research and its application.
TnE ELEmENT OF A "PENAL SANCTION"
IN SUTHERLAND'S DEFINITION
Provisions of a "penal sanction" is at the heart of
Sutherland's definition. Sutherland argues that the
provision of an injunction, treble damages, or a
stipulation as relief from the injury caused by an
act constitutes provision of a penal sanction. In the
case of an injunction, this is because failure to
obey its terms is in-turn punishable by fine and/or
imprisonment for contempt of court. Treble dam-
ages are held to be a punishment equivalent to a
fine. A regulatory stipulation not followed may lead
to a cease and desist order. Failure to obey the
cease and desist order.can lead to the granting of
an injunction, and so on. In Sutherland's view, if a
course of action can ultimately legally lead the
actor to jail or require him to pay more than the
damage he is assessed to have caused, the law
provides a penal sanction.
Thus construed, a simple breach of a business or
professional contract. is a white-collar crime, as is
negligence in carrying out one's business or profes-
sion. A plaintiff may sue for the breach or the
negligence-in acivil court. If the court or jury finds
for the plaintiff, the court customarily will make
the defendant pay court costs. This is distinguished
from payment of damages caused by the breach.
Payment of costs; in other words, represents pay-
ment for a social injury greater than that caused
the defendant. As a social cost, the defendant pays
for the injury he has done, thus fitting Sutherland's
notion of a penal sanction. Sutherland's definition
effectively obliterates the distinction between civil
and ciiminal wrongs.
Sutherland is conceptually safe in not distin-
guishing civil from criminal wrongs The two
categories do not differentiate wrongs by serious-
ness. The crime ofembezzlement of a few thousand
dollars from a large corporation, for example,
would hardly be considered more serious than a
company's violation of a contract through careless
delay in shipping badly needed equipment at a
cost of tens of thousands of dollars in lost time to
the buyer.
Sutherland maintains that white-collar crimes
can occur without judicial findings of wrongful
conduct. However, even if Sutherland's definition
were to require a judicial finding of wrongdoing,
criminal and civil wrongs would not be significantly
distinguishable. The difference in the formal burden
of proof required in civil and criminal proceedings
is, in practice, illusory. It is commonly held by
those who act or have acted as defense counsel
that the judge or jury weighing the facts in a
criminal case begins with a presumption that the
defendant must be guilty or he would not be in
court. This generally renders meaningless the
formal requirement of proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Plea bargaining leads to guilty
pleas in most cases, and so criminal defendants
are usually not even tried. Sudnow found that the
group of public defenders he studied based their
bargaining on their own practically universal
presumption of the defendant's guilt, and their
conclusion that trials would be a waste of time.5
From this author's limited experience, and from
talking with other attorneys, it appears that, if
anything, in practice, civil courts have a more
exacting burden of proof than do criminal courts.
The requirement of proof by a preponderance of
the evidence appears to be more rigidly adhered
to than the mythical requirement of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt. A form of bargaining takes
place in most civil cases too, for they are generally
settled out of court. However, it is standard prac-
tice for the civil defendant not to acknowledge
liability, and, in fact, to be released from all claims
of liability to the plaintiff in exchange for his pay-
ment. Thus, if anything, there is greater reason to
believe that a finding of civil liability demonstrates
wrongdoing than to believe that a criminal convic-
tion does so. From a conceptual point of view, if
statutory offenses committed by business and pro-
fessional people in the course of their work are to
be considered white-collar crimes, it is appropriate
to attach the same label to torts and breaches of
contract committed by these people in their work.
TEm ELEMENT OF A "LEGALLY DEFINED SOCIAL
INjURY" IN SuTHERLAND's DEFINITION
The words "social injury" in this part of Suther-
land's definition may simply be read as "act."
Sutherland does not allow for the possibility that
any act legally defined for which a penal sanction
is provided is not a social injury. This assumption
is highly problematic. Statutory crimes may be
created without adequate evidence that a social
injury is stated. The electric company conspiracy
cases of ten years ago illustrate the point.
5 Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of




In 1961, twenty-nine corporations (electric
companies) and forty-five individuals were tried
and convicted of anti-trust violations under
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Fines were
imposed and seven of the individual defendants,
including a vice-president of General Electric,
received thirty-day jail sentences. The defendants'
crime was to arrange whose bid would be the lowest
and what the amount of the bid would be prior to
the bidding for the sale of heavy electric equip-
ment. The bids were allocated so that each par-
ticipating corporation would receive a fixed per-
centage of the market.
8
The injury said to be caused by such an arrange-
ment is threefold-a poorer quality product, less
efficient production and higher prices to the buyers.
This shibboleth, however, is without adequate
empirical foundation.
From the point of view of economic theory, the
injury caused by price-fixing is shown by models
contrasting oligopolistic or monopolistic markets
to competitive ones. The problem with this com-
parison is that a competitive market as an abstrac-
tion cannot exist as a reality. The competition
model assumes that there are enough suppliers so
that no one of them can affect prices, that each of
the suppliers has unlimited immediate access to
all resources needed for production and distribu-
tion, that the resources can be obtained and used
by all suppliers at equal, invariant cost, that cost
accounting systems are invariant among suppliers,
that the cost accounting system used shows the
true cost of production and distribution, and that
the quality of the product is unidimensional and
invariant among all suppliers. The assumptions are
rarely met in real life. In producing heavy electric
equipment, for instance, there may not be im-
mediate access to steel during periodic shortages.
Not all producers of the equipment can be equally
close to producers of steel at lowest available cost.
Variations in cost accounting systems are legion,
such as the difference between determining cost of
a product shipped from inventory on a last-in-
first-out versus first-in-first-out method. These
methods are apt to yield different costs and neither
is the right approach. Finally, advertising has
taught us the vagaries of assessing the quality of a
product. A supplier will naturally try to establish
6 See Geis, The Heavy Flectrical Fquip ent Anti-
trust Cases of 1961, in CRnmraN BEHAVIOR SYsTEMS
139 (Clinard & Quinney eds. 1967); Smith, The In-
credible Fectrical Conspiracy, in DELINQuENcY, CIME,
AND SocIAL PRocEss 884 (Cressey & Ward eds. 1969).
that his product differs from others in a way that
makes it of the higher quality, and the criteria
for quality can be varied to suit the supplier's
product. Hence, economic modeling has no ade-
quate way of assessing the relative cost to the
buyer or the supplier of an oligopolistic or a monop-
olistic market.
From an empirical point of view, it is practically
impossible to establish that harm is caused by
price-fixing. Damages against the electric com-
panies were established by comparing prices
during the activity of the conspiracy to prices
during a period when the conspiracy had broken
down. However, the price cuts were in some meas-
ure at least a product (and a cause) of movement
out of the conspiracy. These price levels provide
no indication of what prices would have been had
there been no conspiracy in the first place. In
fact, to compare price levels adequately would
require the simultaneous existence in the same
economy of two markets for the same product with
sellers and buyers having the same resources in
each-one market with a price-fixing conspiracy
and the other without That such a situation could
obtain is improbable, to say the least.
As a matter of fact, the electric company con-
spiracies retained a strong element of competition,
suggesting in another way that elements of compe-
tition on the one hand, and of oligopolies and
monopolies on the other, are in reality interactive
rather than independent. The electric companies
fought over market shares and price levels. De-
monstrably, there was considerable competition
over the percentage of bids allocated to each
company. Presumably, the companies who were
able to make the heavy electric equipment at the
lowest cost fought to have prices set at a low
enough level that the less efficient producers would
have to serve portions of the market at less than
cost. The more efficient producers would then have
had an advantage over their less efficient brethren
in serving the more costly portions of the market.
This would have strengthened the bargaining
position of the more efficient producers in negotia-
tions over allocation of market shares. The level
of movement for competitive advantage was most
forcefully demonstrated in the two periods int
which electric companies underbid each other in
violation of the terms of the conspiracy, and the-
conspiracy fell apart. From an empirical stand-
point, then, price-fixing arrangements wouldl
appear to involve the same pressures for low pricea
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and efficient production as does more manifest
competition. Price-fixing, a legally defined act
with a penal sanction attached, cannot be shown
to constitute a social injury.
Conversely, a social -injury committed in the
course of business or professional activity may not
be legally defined (let alone not having a penal
sanction' provided). For example, automobile
exhaust contributes substantially to air pollution.
In this sense, a driver is committing a social
injury, though the act of driving is not in and of
itself legally'defined as a crime in any sense. Under
the heading'of'-white-collar crime, one might be
moved to analyze the decision of a businessman to
use trucks instead of trains to move his product
for the sake of "minimizing air pollution; yet,
Sutherland's dflnition manifestly precludes con-
sideration of" uch a question. Conceptually, then,
use "of "a legally defined social injury" as an ele-
ment of the definition of the subject matter of
white-collar crime cannot be defended.
PROBLEMS 'OF OPERATIONALIZATION OF
S TEERLAND'S DEFINITION
Even were Sutherland's definition conceptually
adequate, it wvould still be inadequate in another
critical way. It has proven to be unworkable in
research Mn part'becAuse of the insuperable diffi-
culties p~sedby itS operationalization. There is no
adequate way to locate Sutherland's white-collar
criminals as a asis ,for explaining either their ac-
tivity or the'societal ieaction to their activity.
Groves" study of income-tax compliance by
fesidential lafidlords' (excluding corporations) in a
Wisconsin ciy illustrates the point.7 It appears
to be the most carbful attempt to date to locate
and desciibe a kind' of white-collar crime. Groves
found what to him were some clear cases of tax
evasion.' Twen'ty-three multiple-unit landlords,
who indicated ,in' interviews that they had an
average renial income of slightly over $1000, had
not filed state ,returns. It is possible, however, that
exemption's ind eligibility for reporting income
jointly with spouses lowered their income suffi-
ciently that they were not legally required to file
returns. For the few (eight) multiple-unit land-
lords who" filed returns but reported no rental
income (who again reported to interviewers an
average income slightly in excess of $1000), there
is no -indication that the interview estimates of
7 Groves, An Empirical Study of Income Tax Com-
pliance, 11 NAT'L TAX J. 241 (1958).
income took account of vacancies or delinquent
rent payments. Depending on how the interviewers
presented themselves, the landlord might have
felt moved to exaggerate the income they received
to demonstrate business acumen. It is also possi-
ble that for these landlords rental expenses ex-
ceeded income. In such a case, the landlords would
be guilty of filing improper returns, but not neces-
sarily of tax evasion.
Groves purportedly showed that those landlords
reporting rental income over-reported their ex-
penses by approximately 10 per cent, thereby
evading taxes in yet another way. This finding was
based primarily on a comparison of reported ex-
penses with realtors' estimates as to what expenses
should be (i.e., about 50 per cent of gross rent,
whatever the type of structure). However, realtors
who are in the business of selling rental property
might plausibly be expected to tend to under-
estimate the actual expenses their buyers would
incur. Here again, evasion by landlords is not
adequately established.
Similar criticisms could be made of the tena-
bility of each of Groves' findings. Even this in-
complete summary highlights the problems one
encounters in a field of study defined by a particu-
lar, and yet various, set of acts. One hundred-fifty
years of attempts to measure the occurrence of
crime have demonstrated the futility of basing the
study of any area of crime on adequate knowledge
of the occurrence of most categories of legally
proscribed acts.8 The very decision that an offense
has occurred is still commonly a complex, socially
negotiated, largely unexplained process. It remains
a formidable challenge to move from the abstract
notion that legally proscribed acts occur to a set
of researchable questions about that abstraction.
Sutherland's definition fails to meet the challenge,
and that task remains also for someone who would
reconceptualize the subject matter of a field of
white-collar crime.
Conceptually, also, Tappan's argument that a
judicial finding of guilt should be the operational
element of the definition of white-collar crime
rests on weak ground. Even in those few cases in
which a jury "determines" the fact of guilt or
innocence, our faith in the determination has no
more rational foundation than that of some of our
predecessors in trial by ordeal. 9 Indeed, protection
8 H. PEPimsxy, PoLcE DECISIONS To REPORT Or-
FENCES, 1972 (dissertation, University of Pennsyl-
vania).9See Aubert, Chance in Social Affairs, 2 INQuIRY 1
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of the secrecy of jury deliberations is plausibly
explained in part as a protection of the sanctity of
the myth of the infallibility of "twelve good men
and true." While adherence to Tappan's definition
would protect those not adjudicated guilty of
crime, it would also lend unwarranted credence to
the stigma attached to convicted offenders; these
latter would be the victims of Tappan's definition.
Insofar as Sutherland's definition would lead us to
accept the greater likelihood of our own culpability,
and therefore stigmatize any white-collar criminal
with less vigor than we would be inclined to do
under Tappan's conception of crime, less harm
would be apt to result from the use of Sutherland's
definition than Tappan's reformulation. Suther-
land's operational definition is thus the more
acceptable of the two, though it too is inadequate.
GUIDELINES FOR AN ADEQUATE REFoRmULATION
OF SuTHERLAND'S DFINTION
A reformulation of Sutherland's definition of
white-collar crime should attempt to avoid the
three pitfalls described above. It should not make
a spurious attempt to distinguish the commission
of criminal from that of civil injury. It should not
rest on the assumption that legal proscriptions
describe a unitary set of phenomena. It should
not study unascertainable behavior directly.
Essentially, any white-collar crime is a challenge
to an alleged use of private property. A finding of
tax evasion, for example, implies that the property
of the government has been withheld by the tax-
payer for his own use. Price-fixing is deemed
criminal because presumably it enables the seller
either to obtain some purchase money from the
buyer or to retain control of the resources that
would pass to the buyer in greater quality in the
product he buys for his money. By failing to exer-
cise legally prescribed precautions in controlling
smoke emissions, an industry arguably uses air
that has been the property of others.
This suggests that white-collar crime is legally
defined after all. The legal owner is one whose
right to the use of property is superior to all others.
The owner may be the one who has lost the use of
the property or the one who has gained it. If the
one who successfully appropriates the use has a
superior legal right, his act is legitimate. If this
right is inferior, he has committed a crime. In a
(1959). See also, Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful
Degradation Ceremonies, 61 Am. J. SocIoLoGY 420
(1956).
sense, Sutherland was correct. Property crimes
are socially injurious be~ause..the. law declares
them to be so.
A number of social analysts ,such as Marx °
and Quinney," have pointed out, thek weakness of
the assumption that law. discriminates socialy
injurious preferences in use of property fromnon-
injurious preferences. As. Hart..observes, in dis-
cussing justice under law, justice.1s.relative to.the
respect in which "like cases.are reated alike and
different cases treated differently," 12 The criteria
that separate socially injurious preferences from
non-injurious preferenceg ar6 not 'just in them-
selves; they are artifacts of social power. One of the
devices that can be used to secre- the use of prop-
erty is to influence legislatures and courts to decree
that one's use is superior to another's, When, ,an
employee is convicted of embezzlement and ordered
to make restitution, it affirms the legitimacy of
the employer's priority over tho employee in.de-
termining how the funds shallbe used..If the gov-
ernment that makes that decree is overthrown in a
revolution, the employee may. be able to use the
power of the new govermment.-tQ -make the. em-
ployer surrender the funds to him If, the socio-
economic bias inherent in use .preference is con-
trolled,'the character of the injury to either party
in not having the use of the funds is essentially the
same. If the parties want to-use,the funds' in
different ways, there is a social injury of essentially
the same type regardless of which party prevails.
To say that there is a higher social interest -in
maintaining one's ordering Qf property rights, and
that such an interest is injury, implies that the
interests of various segments of the populace in the
use of property have an- inherent right. to moral
preference over the interests of others. Thus,
acceptance of legal definitions of ownership-would
represent an acceptance of the socio-economic bias
Sutherland sought to. avoid by ,his redefinition.
This reformulation of Sutherlands. definition
endorses no socio-economic bias, :and therefore
equates the position of the embezler.with that of
his employer. Each causes equal social.injury if he
gets use of the funds in dispute. Thus, while law
may be an instrument to challenge another's use
of private property, it does not define the charac-
ter of the use, but instead, the character of the
10 K. MA x, EARLY WRTNGs (T. B. Bottomore ed.
1963).
R. QuINNY, Tax SocA REALu o , Carx
(1970).
1
2 See H. L. A. HART, supra nQte 3, at 155.
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challenge. The injury represented by the use is
equivalent whenever there is a challenge, regard-
less of whether law is an instrument of challenge.
The challenger may be assumed to be indicating
that he or his client wants the use of the property
enjoyed by the current user. Uniformly, then, a
social injury caused by those called white-collar
criminals is to deprive others of the use of private
property by their own hegemony. For want of a
better term, this deprivation as it is alleged to
occur will be referred to as exploitation.
POSSIBLE DIvISIONS O znx REFOPMULATION
The reformulated definition is based on the
social injury caused by all acts of exploitation.
Manifestly, exploitation can include many acts
other than those that have been considered white-
collar crimes. Anything called a crime against
private property would come under the rubric of
exploitation. Exploitation would cover a sale of a
product to a customer who expressed the belief
that the quality of the product is less than he
thought he p aid for. Failure of a government to
accept a producer's request to amend a defense
contract because of allegedly previously unfore-
seen expenses would be exploitation. Note that the
definition is already limited in its application. An
unchallenged use of private property is not exploi-
tation, nor can exploitation be applied to the use
of other than private property.
Since the definition of exploitation is extra-
legal, the definition of private property for these
purposes is necessarily also extra-legal. Private
property here refers to a resource over which the
user attempts to hold dominion, on any basis other
than immediate personal need for the use, against
a request for use by another. Hence, state property
may be private property if agents of the state
refuse free access to its use by any who request it.
This definition of private property is similar to
that of Marx, 3 but does not proceed from an analy-
sis of the relation of man to labor. What is apt in
practice to distinguish private property from other
resources is a claim for dominion as against others
based on need that is not personal and immediate.
Thus, in the first place, for the resource not to be
private property, a person must be holding the
resource for his own exclusive use. In the second
place, the exclusive use cannot be projected for
some future time without the resource being pri-
vate property. Hence, if the current user responds
u3 See K. MaY, supra note 10, at 137.
to the request for use by showing he is presently
using the resource, and if the user makes no
attempt to hold the resource when the current use
has stopped, the resource is not private property.
For instance, if Mr. Smith is vacuuming his house
when Mr. Jones asks for the vacuum cleaner, Mr.
Smith's refusal to relinquish the cleaner until the
vacuuming is completed does not give the cleaner
the character of private property. If, however, Mr.
Smith refuses to relinquish the cleaner because he
plans to use it in a few days, the cleaner takes on
the character of private property and refusal to
relinquish its use is exploitation. Where resources
are made available to all who would use them-a
collective use confirmed by an absence or any
challenge-such resource is also presumed not to
have the character of private property.
A failure to share a vacuum cleaner would
scarcely be considered a white-collar crime, limited
though the definition of exploitation may be. Not
only has the element, "crime," been eliminated
as a restriction on the definition of the field, but
the "white-collar" has been taken from it also. This
has been done in the name of conceptual unity. The
only justification for placing boundaries around a
field of study is to emphasize the known distinc-
tion between the character of the subject matter
within and without the field. When class or occupa-
tional variables are added to exploitation to define
this field of study, the distinction between intra-
and extra-field research becomes intolerably
blurred, or the connection between elements of the
definition becomes conceptually tenuous. If we try
to capture in the definition Sutherland's notion of
the special character of social injuries committed
by persons of relatively high socio-economic status
(SES), we have no one way to operationalize the
distinction between high and low SES-levels. If we
choose an arbitrary income level as a point of
division, or a distinction between wage-earners and
the salaried, or followers of specific occupations, we
do not know in advance that the nature of the
injury or of the response to it changes significantly
between groups. Any difference cannot concep-
tually be definitive of a separate field of study until
the difference is known.
The same applies to an attempt to separate
business or professional-related social injuries from
others. An operationalization of this boundary is
not obvious to begin with. Does a housewife who
spends a paycheck for groceries and rent without
giving her husband money for entertainment do so
[Vol. 65
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in the course of her business or profession? If a list
of occupations and/or professions is specified, what
can unite them in distinction to other courses of
activity in terms of the nature of exploitation or of
a response to exploitation committed within
them? The relationship between the phenomenon,
exploitation, and other operationalizable variables
describing classes of alleged exploiters is as yet
unknown. Areas of study within the field of exploi-
tation for specific classes or alleged exploiters can
therefore not yet be distinguished to define sub-
fields. While specific research questions about the
character of exploitation in particular settings can
be asked, the field cannot be restricted to fit the
vague notion of white-collar crime or criminals.
Some divisions of the field are possible. Study of
the factors associated with exploitation can be
distinguished from studies of factors associated
with different kinds of social response to exploita-
tion. This is analogous to the division between the
positive school14 and the societal reaction school15
in the field of deviance. While an interactionist
might dispute the merits of drawing such a distinc-
tion, it does reflect a real choice that a researcher
needs to make between dependent variables, and
is therefore defensible. Other phenomenological
distinctions are possible-exploitation from the
point of view of the exploiter, of the challenger and
of third parties. Further divisions are not yet
warranted.
OPRATIONALiZATiON OF THE REFOzmLATION
The chief problem of operationalization of
Sutherland's definition is the impossibility of
deciding whether a violation of law has "actually"
occurred. A comparable problem does not arise in
the operationalization of the concept of exploita-
tion. Exploitation is per se an alleged use of private
property by any challenge thereto, provided the
challenge is by someone who claims he, or someone
in whose favor he speaks, should have, or should
have had use of the property. The exploitation
exists by virtue of the challenge. Whether the use
of private property actually occurred may remain
problematic. This latter question could con-
ceivably, if inadequately, be explored in an in-
vestigation of factors associated with exploitation,
but its answer is not required to define the subject
matter of the field. The challenge itself implies the
I'D. MATZA, DELiNQuENCY AND DzRtr (1964).
"5 Schur, Reactions to Deviance: A Critical Assess-
ment, 75 Am. J. SocioLoGo 309 (1969).
existence of the institution of private property in a
society, and that alone is undoubtedly a sufficient,
as well as a necessary, condition, for contention over
the use of the property. Furthermore, the accusa-
tion in the challenge presents social conflict in
itself-a social injury calling for response whether
or not there is truth in the allegation. This is not a
new observation. The two thousand year old
dynastic order in China was built on a recognition
that one person's accusation of another necessarily
represents social conflict. The Chinese made this
postulate the foundation of their legal system.
18
The definition of exploitation is simply another
recognition of the principle.
CONCLUSION:
APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF EXPLOITATION'
The study of property crime, in general, and
white-collar crime, in particular, has been founded
on an unfulfillable promise. The crux of the
promise is that violations of criminal law are what
disrupt the harmonious coexistence of society's
members. By locating the conditions that lead to
crime, and changing them to eliminate the phe-
nomenon, society's members will live in peaceful,
happy harmony. By acting against crime con-
scientiously, we may not eliminate the causes of
interpersonal strife, but at least interpersonal con-
flict will be controlled and thereby reduced.
An analysis of Sutherland's and Tappan's
definitions of white-collar crime shows how tenuous
the promise is. The substantive provisions of the
law are just as apt to defend social injury as to
react against it. In Sutherland's terms, a strict
application of penal sanctions would likely punish
most of society's members repeatedly. In the
"discovery" of white-collar crime, given the va-
garies of operationalization of the term, the socially
powerful few could be expected amorally to prevail.
The social scientist, as he thus delimits a field of
inquiry, may socially dictate the categories by
which one man's claim of injury is given higher
status than another's, while in a paradoxical sense,
one man's righting of a wrong is another's wrong-
ing of a right. As Sutherland was undoubtedly
moved to isolate and weaken one source of social
conflict and inequity, he sowed the seeds of another
source to use in its place.
This failing of Sutherland's definition is re-
1 S. VAN DER SPRENEEL, LEGAL INSTITuTiONs IN
MANcHU CHINA 29 (1962).
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vealed by its conceptual and operational inade-
quacies. Where a coftceptual inadequacy is found
to exist, it is a sign that acceptance of the con-
ceptualization is a manifest threat to the interests
of some who fear the consequences of its social
acceptance. For example, those who can imagine
that what a legislature dictates might not be a
social injury may be imagining that they might be
legally punished for what to them is an innocuous
act that they foresee carrying out. Where an
operational inadequacy is found to exist (in the
field of socioldgy, at least), it is apt to be because
the finder fears the consequences for himself of
being, or not being, as the case may be, associated
with a phenomenon in a way he cannot foresee.
What precautions, for example, can an academician
take to avoid being branded a chronic thief of
writing supplies from his university employer?
Prof. Sutherland 'Was apparently not overly
alarmed at thisprospect.
Our conceptualization of any field of research
and action concerned with social problems neces-
sarily implies an' ideological perspective on the
problem. A recognition that one man's defense
against exploita:tion rhay itself be another man's
exploitation requires us to make an ideological
choice. Are we g6ibig t6 define the field in such a
way as to give one man's exploitation a higher
status than -that facea by 'his adversary? The
choice made in this definition of a field of study is
not to address the problem of one man's injury by
lending legitimacy to the injury of another as a
resolution of th problem.'
The definitiofn' of exploitation obviates the
necessity for ranking injuries. Though the injury
represented by a" challenge to exploitation is
assumed to be real, the role of the alleged exploiter
in 6reating the irijuty is held problematic. Indeed,
when the remedy of- the exploited is likely to result
in the exploitatibn ' of his alleged "offender,"
deprivation of the resources of the alleged exploiter
can scarcely be teen as a' viable strategy to reduce
the" incidence of exploitation in the society. The
remedy, if challenged; would itself be exploitation.
The choice between helping the victim or helping
the offender becomes moot. The victim of exploita-
tion remains the client of him who investigates
and reacts to exploitation, but the immediate
object of change becomes social conditions, not
personalities. The question of what is responsible
for exploitation-based conflict replaces the ques-
tion of who is responsible; personal responsibility
attaches to him who attempts to change these
conditions rather than to the person or group
labeled "exploiter."
There are hints of those social conditions that
might be related to the incidence of exploitation.
Exploitation presupposes the institution of private
property. There might be some societies, like that
of the jungle people, depicted by Henry,"7 in which
there is apparently no such institution, and, there-
fore, no basis for a challenge to exploitation. More
commonplace would be particular settings in
complex societies in which the institution did not
exist. An example would be the case with food in
the refrigerator for some families. Other distinc-
tions between these settings and those in which
exploitation occurred might provide dues as to
how the institution of private property and the
accompanying exploitation might be abolished.
The desirability could be evaluated of having
conditions obtain that were found peculiarly to
accompany the use of resources that do not con-
stitute private property.
A challenge to exploitation could reflect an
ordering on one or the other of two distinct con-
cerns: an alleged use of private property should
change hands, or that the character of the re-
sources allegedy used could be changed so that
they were no longer private property at all. Where
the challenge to exploitation is founded on a
challenge to the institution of private property
itself, as in collectivization of farming resources in
the People's Republic of China, a condition for
reducing exploitation might already exist that
would bear studying, and then establishing else-
where.
One fundamental hypothesis well worth testing
is whether the rate of exploitation in a social
setting can be reduced so long as challenges to
the exploitation have as an object the appropria-
tion of the use of private property. This is to sug-
gest that for those who accept the institution of
private property and who react against exploita-
tion, such exploitation cannot be eliminated. This
was Marx's assertion. 8 It would appear that the
acceptance of the institution of private property
has several concomitants, although these rela-
tionships, too, bear further empirical confirmation.
One concomitant would seem to be acceptance
of social status differentiation. 9 The antithesis of
this acceptance is not, incidentally, a belief that
17 J. HENRY, THE JuNGLr PEoPLE.: A KAINGANG
TRmE o" = HiGHLA~is oF BRAzi. (1964).
sSee K. MARx, supra note 10, at 152-67.
19 Id. at 3-32.
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all men are exactly alike. It is the belief that the
sum of any man's characteristics and talents is of a
social worth exactly the same as any other man's,
and therefore that the two different people deserve
equal respect, admiration and other social rewards.
Acceptance of social status differentiation implies
acceptance of the categorization of people, as, for
instance, deviants, white-collar criminals or
exploiters. It could well imply the casting of one-
self as deserving of exclusive use of private prop-
erty because one is a victim of exploitation. Possi-
bly, also, an investment in a system of socil
status differentiation could support exploitation as
a means of describing and maintaining other
status boundaries.
Acceptance of individualism is another possible
concomitant of acceptance of exploitation and of
the institution of private property20 However,
de Tocqueville ' suggests that this is true only when
the foundations of ascribed status have been
implied away by democratic revolutions. Idi-
vidualism is expressed in the norm that a man's
2See W. BONGER, CRxMNAL ry AND EcoNomnc
CONDrMONS (1969); K. MAxx, supro note 10, at 3-32; E.
ScHUR, OUR CzRnNAL SociETY: SocrAL AND LEGAL
SouRcEs op ComE xN AMERIcA (1968).
"1 A. im TocQuEvLE, DEMocRAcY iN AMERICA 136-
38 (1945).
first duty is to himself and that others must fend
for themselves." Individualism would seem to
-present a climate conducive to the incidence of
exploitation, i.e., that challenges occur to the
perceived antagonism of others to the self-interest
the challenger aims to protect.
As these examples indicate, research on exploi-
tation would comprise studies to isolate particular
conditions under which social processes resulted
in exploitation or its elimination. The field of
exploitation is divisible along two dimensions. One
dimension would classify studies according to the
institutions that support or oppose exploitation.
One such institution is law in any of various forms,
the common law system of response to crime, for
example.
The other dimension includes the settings in-
which exploitation is maintained or eliminated.
One such setting is business activity (which can
be further subdivided) in the United States. Hence,
the phenomena formerly included in the field of
white-collar crinie', in particular, and of criminol-
ogy, in general, are subject to study in the field of
exploitation, but within a more nearly adequate
conceptual framework.
2 Id. at 104-06.
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